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FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
Deductibility of Medical Expenses Which Are Also
Personal Expenses
Can the cost of a television set be deductible as a medical
expense? Over the past six years, medical deductions have been
allowed for air conditioning,' "autoette" wheelchair,2 elevator,3
swimming pool,4 tape recorder, typewriter, special lenses and
projectory lamp,5 special foods,6 and a reclining chair.7 The pre-
ceding list is not complete but is indicative of the "personal
nature" of some medical deductions.
Case law over the years has set forth the following criteria
for a medical deduction: (1) Was the expense incurred at the
direction or suggestion of a physician; (2) Did the treatment bear
1Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, where it was said that air conditioner
installed for the purpose of effecting relief from an allergy or for relieving
difficulty in breathing due to heart condition is deductible if need for it is
substantiated by the evidence, that it is used primarily for the alleviation
of the illness, and does not become a permanent part of the dwelling and
may be removed to other quarters.
2Rev. Rul. 58-8, 1958-1 C.B. 154, where an autoette or wheel chair either
manually operated or self-propelled, and used primarily for alleviation of
taxpayer's disability, was deductible as long as it was not merely to provide
transportation between his residence and place of employment.
3Rev. Rul. 59-411, 1959-2 C.B. 100, where the elevator was installed on the
advice of a doctor to alleviate an acute coronary insufficiency of one Mrs.
Berry. Expenditure for medical purposes will not be denied simply because
they are of a capital nature. James E. Barry et ux. v. Earl R. Wiseman
(W.D. Okla. 1958), 174 F. Supp. 748.
457-2 U.S.T.C. 10,012, in which a jury found that cost of a swimming pool
constructed on doctor's orders for the treatment of taxpayer's wife whohad
suffered from an attack of paralytic poliomyelitus, was deductible.
5Rev. Rul. 58-223, 1958-1 C.B. 156, in which the cost of aid to assist in educa-
tion of child going blind was deductible as tending to mitigate the condi-
tion of the sense of losing sight.
6Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1, C.B. 307 where food prescribed by a physician for
medical purposes and in addition to a normal diet, qualified as a medical
expense.
7Rev. Rul. 58-155, 1958-1 C.B. 156, in which said chair was acquired for the
purpose of obtaining maximum rest by the taxpayer suffering from a
cardiac condition.
such a direct or proximate therapeutic relation to the bodily
condition as to justify a reasonable belief that it would be effica-
cious; and, (3) Was the treatment so proximate in time to the
outset or recurrence of the disease or condition as to make the
one the true occasion of the other, thus eliminating the objection
that the expense was incurred for "general" as contrasted with a
"specific" physical or mental impairment.
8
In still another landmark case, L. Stringham v. Commissioner
of Internal Revenue,9 the court noted that the basic concept of
the Code was that personal expenses are not deductible and that
medical expenses were in no way to encompass items which were
primarily personal living expenses. The court went on to say, in
effect, that there are expenses decidedly medical in character and
those decidedly personal by nature and that it will be a question
of fact where the expenses have characteristics of medical and
personal nature.
Under what fact situation, if any, could a television set be
deducted as a medical expense? Or, is a television set prima facie
a personal living expense and never deductible?
The above problem might be presented in the following
hypothetical situation: Mrs. X, a widow, seeks a medical deduc-
tion for a television set bought by her upon instructions of Doctor
Y, a qualified psychiatrist. Doctor Y has told Mrs. X that the
television will serve to mitigate Mrs. X's eight year old daughter's
mental illness brought on by the child's loneliness while her
mother is away working. Mrs. X dislikes TV and has never made
any use of the set while she was at home.
Section 213(e)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
defines medical care as "amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure,
mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease, or for the purpose
of effecting any structure or function of the body.. ." To satis-
factorily answer this hypothetical problem it is necessary to find
when the definition of medical care will or should include ex-
penses incurred for items which are decidedly personal in nature
and under what circumstances the mere fact that one usually
8Edward A. Havey v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 12 T.C. 409 (1949).
912 T.C. 580 (1949).
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considers an item "personal" should not defeat a claim for a
medical deduction.
A recent revenue ruling allowed a deduction for a reclining
chair,'" hardly an item of a medical nature. In the ruling, a
simplified version of the Havey" test for medical deductions was
laid down. That is, (1) can it be substantiated that the chair was
prescribed by a cardiac specialist; (2) did the chair serve no other
purpose than the mitigation of the physical condition of the
patient; and, (3) was the chair not generally used as an article
of furniture. Certainly the facts of our hypothetical situation fit
this test. The television set was bought under doctor's orders; the
set served no other purpose than the mitigation of the eight year
old's mental illness; and the set was not used generally as an item
of furniture. But before taxpayer concludes that he can get a
medical deduction for a television set, he should consider a line of
thought on medical deductions as illustrated by the case of John
J. Thoene v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.12
In the Thoene case the taxpayer's psychiatrist recommended
that he engage in activities which would bring him into contact
with groups of people in a social environment by way of a cure
for his emotional disturbances. A few months later, Taxpayer
underwent an abdominal operation which had the effect of
weakening his legs. The physician suggested mild exercise of the
legs and the psychiatrist reiterated his advice that taxpayer should
enroll in dancing school. The court said, in denying the deduc-
tion for the cost of dance lessons, that normally such expenses
must be considered personal and the government did not intend
that dance lessons would constitute medical care. What the doc-
tors had suggested were purely personal activities - the same
benefits could be derived from playing golf and participating in
the activities of a country club. The court cited the Havey13
case for the proposition that Congress never intended purely
personal expenses to be deductible. To put the results of this
case in terms of the Havey test, the court seemed to be saying
1ORev. Rul. 58-155, supra note 7.
llSupra note 8.
1233 T.C. 62 (1959).
13Havey, supra note 8.
that the expense was incurred for a general as contrasted with
specific mental impairment since the treatment was not so proxi-
mate in time to the outset or recurrence of the disease or condi-
tion as to make the one the true occasion of the other.
The result of the Thoene case, as contrasted with the host of
revenue rulings permitting deductions for items just as personal
in nature as dancing lessons, will probably have a two-fold effect.
First, because of the underlying theory that Congress did not
intend to give a deduction for personal expenses, the courts
appear to be drawing a line, the one side of which will be ex-
penses which are always personal in nature and non-deductible
per se. Secondly, it has been posited that the traditional test in
the Havey case is so dearly set forth in terms relating to physical
diseases and conditions that cases involving mental illness and
their treatment cannot qualify, and yet as the understanding of
mental illness and treatment progresses, these should qualify as
legitimate medical expenses.14 This suggestion, then, is based on
the notion that the cure for mental diseases cannot be as specific
as that for physical diseases; or, to paraphrase the last phrase in
terms of the Havey case, the treatment cannot be so proximate
in time to the outset or recurrence of the mental disease as to
make one the true occasion of the other. But should this defeat
the deduction?
In allowing a deduction for an air conditioner 5 or an "auto-
ette,"16 it is easy to see the direct relation between the treatment
and the cure, the treatment being so "proximate in time to the out-
set..." Such relationship is not so obvious in the case of
dancing lessons or a television set to mitigate a mental illness;
nevertheless, there should be no discrimination between expenses
paid for the cure of mental illness and those paid for physical
illnesses.
In the past it has been ruled that amounts paid to psycholo-
gists come within the meaning of medical care and are deduc-
14Curhan, Deductibility of Transportation Costs as Medical Expenses Turns on
Intent, 13 J. TAXATION 31 (1960).
15Rev. Rul. 55-261, supra note 1.
16Rev. Rul. 58-8, supra note 2.
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tible.17 Moreover in the case of a child suffering from severe
emotional disturbances and thereby necessitating a special treat-
ment school, the deduction for school costs is allowed.18 Here
the cure and the illness are closely related and the cure is clearly
proximate in time to the outset of the disease, whereas in the
Thoene case and our hypothetical problem, it is more difficult to
see both the close relationship of the cure to the disease and the
close relationship of the time of the cure to the outset of the
disease.
On the other hand perhaps the court is merely laying down
the rule in the Thoene case (as was suggested earlier) that cer-
tain expenses will always be personal, irrespective of whether
the alleged medical expenses were incurred in seeking a cure for
a mental or a physical illness. If this is the case, the courts should
keep in mind the fundamental purpose of the medical deduction
as expressed by the Senate Finance Committee: "This allowance
is recommended in consideration of the heavy tax burden that
must be borne by individuals during the existing emergency and
of the desirability of maintaining the present high level of public
health."' 9 Conceding that the expense should be one primarily
incurred for the prevention or cure of a disease, the fact that
the expense is one which is ordinarily thought of as personal in
nature should not be of over-riding importance in determining the
validity of a claim for a medical deduction if the purpose of the
deduction as expressed in the Senate Report be taken into
consideration.
Prior to the Thoene case, the Tax Court, in a memorandum
decision, did take the position that an expense for a mental illness
was deductible even though personal in nature.20 The deduction
in this case was claimed for money spent by a husband to rent a
car in which he took his mentally ill wife, who was confined to
17Rev. Rul. 53-143, 1953-2 C.B. 129.
IsRev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307, modified by Rev. Rul. 58-280, 1958-1
C.B. 157.
19S. Rept. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., (1942), p. 6 as noted in 12 T.C.
580, 583 (1949).
20Estate of Benjamin v. Pepper, 56,167 P-H Tax Ct. Rept. Mem. Dec.
(1956).
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a rest home, for rides. These rides through the country were
suggested by the resident physician at the rest home and testimony
was given to the effect that "countryside" rides were accepted
therapeutic treatment for the wife's particular psychiatric condi-
tion. The court here again cites the Havey test for medical deduc-
tions and concludes that the facts here meet the test requirements.
The Tax Court here allowed a deduction for expenses incurred
by renting a car in which to take pleasure rides through the
countryside - an expense incurred for something of no less per-
sonal nature than dancing lessons. The conclusion to be drawn is
that the Court recognized that treatment for mental illnesses
might not be, in terms of Havey, proximate in time to the recur-
rence or onset of the disease, that the expenses might be personal
in nature, but that the deduction might nevertheless be allowed.
The Thoene case represents a retreat from this position.2'
In conclusion, two stumbling blocks have been laid in the
way of including amounts spent for items of a highly personal
nature within the definition of expenses for medical care. First,
is the general feeling expressed since the enactment of the medical
deduction that Congress did not intend to give deductions for
personal expenses. As a result certain expenses will always be of a
personal nature and never deductible. A second stumbling
block, not as precisely set forth as the first but seemingly present,
is the notion that the cure must follow the treatment so that the
one is the true occasion of the other. Thus the inclination has been
to deny the deduction where the above relationship is not so
obvious. This is particularly apparent in the treatment of mental
diseases which is not of the precise nature of medical treatment
for physical illnesses. It is clear from the purpose of the deduction
as set forth in the Senate Finance Committee report2 and from
21In passing it should be mentioned that traveling expenses incurred by parents
to visit their mentally ill daughter as part of her therapy have been ruled
deductible. (Rev. Rul. 58-533, 1958-2 C.B. 108). That ruling is con-
cerned with transportation costs which have developed into a rather sepa-
rate field outside the scope of this note. Also a very recent case, Namrow
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 33 T.C. 419 (1960), did not allow
expenses for psychiatric treatment but the facts revealed that the persons
concerned hadl undergone psychiatric treatment as part of their training
program in psychiatry; this made it clear that these expenses were not
incurred for any medical purposes.
22Supra, note 19.
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the appreciation of the divergencies of treatment of mental dis-
eases that these stumbling blocks should be eliminated.
Finally, as to the solution of the hypothetical problem of the
deductibility of the television set, one can only offer this answer,
a television is so associated with personal pleasures that the tax-
payer will have to make out an extremely exact case fitting all
the requirements as set forth in the traditional medical deduc-
tion cases.2 The chances now seem to be that the deduction will
23Supra notes 8 and 9.
not be allowed on a theory that such an item as a television set
was never intended to be deducted. However, the better view of
the overall policy behind the medical deduction seems to be that
Congress intended this tax break as a means of assisting those
whose medical bills had used up a good portion of their income
so that some kind of a "break" was necessary. Following this line
of reasoning, the "nature" of the claimed deduction should be
immaterial; only a satisfactory explanation that such expenses
were in fact incurred in the alleviation, mitigation, prevention,
or cure of a mental or physical disease should be necessary. If
this were so, the television set in the hypothetical case would
clearly be deductible.
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